A closer look at the new Eads decision

From the February 2025 Criminal Defense Newsletter
The Wayne County Prosecutor is likely to appeal the new 2 to 1 decision of the Court of Appeals in People v Eads (On Remand), ___ Mich __ App ___ (Docket No. 357332, 1/16/25), because the case begs the question: What are the practical limits to a term of years for a juvenile offender? The majority reversed a sentence of 50 to 75 years, finding cruel or unusual punishment. Is the decision an outlier or a harbinger of things to come?

Mr. Eads was 16 years old when he committed a senseless, gang-related murder in Detroit. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, acquitting him of a higher charge. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 50 to 75 years, exceeding the (judicial) sentencing guidelines range of 12 to 25 years.

The judge imposed sentence in 1992, long before ground-breaking decisions precluding the death penalty for juvenile offenders (2005),1 a life sentence for juveniles convicted of a non-homicide offense (2010),2 and a mandatory life without parole sentence for juveniles convicted of homicide (2012).3 Although the trial judge was aware of the defendant’s chaotic childhood (raising himself alone from the age of 11) and reliance on gang members for a sense of community, the judge viewed the crime as a senseless killing and deserving of a term of years that would preclude parole for most if not all of Mr. Eads’s life.

In a split decision (Judges Mariano and Borrello in the majority, and Judge Murray in dissent), the Court of Appeals reversed. The sentence was both disproportionately severe and cruel or unusual punishment. In practical effect, the sentence exceeds Mr. Eads’s life expectancy (estimated at roughly 64 years), thus precluding release based on personal rehabilitation. Compared to sentences for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, the sentence received by Mr. Eads was longer than the term of years that is permitted by statute under MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a (i.e., a minimum term not to exceed 40 years and a maximum term of 60 years). Compared to the decision in People v Stovall, 4 a long term of years was arguably harsher than the parolable life sentence struck down in Stovall for a juvenile offender.

All in all, the sentence of 50 to 75 years for a 16-year-old offender warranted relief from judgment because it was invalid and defendant satisfied the test for relief from judgment (i.e., that the proportionality challenge was based on a retroactive change in the law and the constitutional challenge could not have been raised earlier because the supporting law did not yet exist).

Where does this leave us? It seems safe to say that juvenile offenders convicted of murder are subject to lesser sentences than might be imposed upon adults for the same crime, as a general rule. But how might this play out for juveniles convicted of armed robbery or first degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC)? The decision says nothing about a long term of years for robbery, although presumably a juvenile would fare well in challenging a longer-than-life sentence in light of Eads. The decision also says nothing about the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term for a 17-year-old who commits CSC first-degree against an individual under the age of 13,5 or the mandatory sentence of life without parole for an 18-year-old who is convicted of CSC first-degree against an individual under the age of 13, if the offender has a prior CSC conviction involving a victim under the age of 13.6 These mandatory sentences, especially the latter, might not survive renewed scrutiny.

But moving in a different direction, does the discussion of life expectancy matter when it comes to a term of years imposed on an adult? Last year in People v Purdle, the Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a long term of years (56 years, 8 months to 80 years) for a 31-year-old offender convicted of second-degree murder, reasoning that the defendant’s age and race did not matter to the proportionality analysis.7 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, with only one dissent from Justice Welch.8 The decision in Purdle, at least temporarily, chilled any hope for return of a life expectancy rule for a long term of years for an adult offender. Whether Eads will reopen that discussion remains to be seen.

Finally, does the Eads decision represent a return to a subjective analysis for cruel or unusual punishment claims, as the dissent suggests? Or is this another step forward in the way society views juveniles and punishment? Will the Michigan Supreme Court reverse – because sometimes development of the law is not linear – or will it even hear the case?

So many unanswered questions.

Endnotes

1 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005).
2 Graham v Florida, 560 US 48 (2010).
3 Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012).
4 People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022).
5 MCL 750.520b(2)(b).
6 MCL 750.520b(2)(c).
7 People v Purdle (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___ (Docket No. 353821, 2/22/24).
8 People v Purdle, 12 NW3d 628 (2024).
 
Anne Yantus
Michigan Sentencing PLLC

Anne Yantus is a sentence consultant working with attorneys to promote more favorable sentencing outcomes. Anne credits her knowledge of Michigan sentencing law to the many years she spent handling plea and sentencing appeals with the State Appellate Defender Office. Following her time with SADO, Anne taught a criminal sentencing course at the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law and subsequently continued to write and speak on felony sentencing law while serving as pro bono counsel with Bodman PLC. Anne welcomes your Michigan felony sentencing questions and is happy to arrange a consultation where appropriate. 

Due to the volume of inquiries, Anne is not able to respond to pro bono requests for assistance or analysis of individual fact situations.